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Experimental subjects are not different
By FILIPPOS EXADAKTYLOS, ANTONIO M. ESPÍN AND PABLO BRAÑAS-GARZA*
Abstract
Experiments using economic games are becoming a major source for the
study of human social behavior. These experiments are usually conducted
with university students who voluntarily choose to participate. Across the
natural and social sciences, there is some concern about how this
“particular” subject pool may systematically produce biased results.
Focusing on social preferences, this study employs data from a surveyexperiment conducted with a representative sample of a city’s population
(N=765). We report behavioral data from five experimental decisions in
three canonical games: dictator, ultimatum and trust games. The dataset
includes students and non-students as well as volunteers and nonvolunteers. We separately examine the effects of being a student and being
a volunteer on behavior, which allows a ceteris paribus comparison between
self-selected students (students*volunteers) and the representative
population. Our results suggest that self-selected students are an
appropriate subject pool for the study of social behavior.
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An introduction on the importance of experimental research using economic
games is no longer necessary. Economic experiments are well established as
a useful tool for studying human behavior within social scientists. Over the last
years however, human experimentation has also found a central place in the
research agendas of evolutionary biologists (1,2,3,4,5,6), physiologists (7,8,
9,10,11,12), neuroscientists (13,14,15,16,17,18) and physicists (19,20,21,22,
23,24). The increasing number of well-published experimental studies and the
impact they have on various fields across a number of disciplines has touched
off a lively debate over the degree to which these data can indeed be used to
refine, falsify and develop new theories, to build institutions and legal
systems, to inform policy and to even make general inferences about the
human nature (25,26,27,28,29). In other words, the central issue is now about
the external validity of the experimental data.
The main concern about external validity is related to certain features of
experimental practices on the one hand (high levels of scrutiny, low monetary
stakes and the abstract nature of the tasks), and a very particular subject pool
on the other.
The latter has two dimensions. First, the subject pool in behavioral
experiments is almost exclusively comprised of university students. More
than the narrow socio-demographic array of characteristics that this group
offers, what really threatens external validity is the existence of different
behavioral patterns once such characteristics have been controlled for. That
is, the under-representation of certain strata of the population is obviously true
but not the real issue: once the distribution of these characteristics is known
for the general population, researchers can account for such differences by
adjusting the right weights to their statistical models. The real question in
extrapolating students’ behavior to general populations is whether the
coefficient estimates differ across the groups due to non-controllable
variables. We should say that there is student bias if, after controlling for
socio-demographics, students behave differently than the general population.
The second dimension is that participants are volunteers. Naturally, the
behavior of non-volunteers is not observed. There is a self-selection bias if

volunteers share some attributes that make their behavior systematically
diverge from that of non-volunteers.
The concern of the researchers of such biases is echoed by the increasing
number of studies recruiting other, more general samples. A pronounced
example is the use of the web in order to recruit subjects using platforms such
as the Amazon Mechanical Turk (30, 31). Such attempts are very valuable
since alternative samples are the best way of testing the robustness and
generality of the results. However without specific information on how the
alternative subject pool affects the results, leaving the physical laboratory and
the control that this offers can be time-, energy- and money-consuming
without necessarily positive returns in terms of generalizability.
So far insights as to whether student and self-selection biases systematically
affect behavior can be found mainly in the economics’ literature. Regarding
student bias there are two main sources. The first comes from experiments
using both students and individuals pooled from a target population (see for
example 32,33,34,35,36). These belong to the family of the so-called
artefactual field experiments (37). The second comes from databases
containing behavioral data drawn from more general populations. This allows
researchers to test whether different sub-samples (e.g., students) exhibit
different behavioral patterns (38,39,40,41,42,43). In the realm of social
preferences, both practices have been extensively used over the last years,
giving rise to a large number of field experiments. There is now plenty of
evidence demonstrating that students are slightly less “pro-social” than other
groups in a variety of designs and settings. For example students have been
shown to behave less generously (44,45), less cooperatively (40,42,46,47)
and less trustfully (48,49).
However, the bulk of this evidence comes from comparing students who selfselect to experiments with other non-student samples who again self-select.
So, what this literature gives evidence for is a small student bias but only
within volunteers. Whether self-selected students’ behavior is representative
for individuals who are not students and do not volunteer in scientific studies
(presumably the “median” individual) we cannot know. Nor can we know
whether self-selected students behave differently than non-self-selected

students (the majority of the student population); ultimately we cannot know
whether students in general are less pro-social than non-students (either selfselected or not). Thus, responding to concerns about student bias requires
the simultaneous study of self-selection bias, which ultimately implies looking
also within non-student populations
Concerning self-selection bias, research has been relatively limited since this
involves obtaining behavioral data of individuals not willing to participate to
experiments. For student populations, researchers get hold of such datasets
by making participation semi-obligatory during a class (50,51). However, there
are good reasons to assume that the behavior of these pseudo-volunteers will
be quite distinct of the non-volunteers’ due to prominent demand effects (52).
Indeed both (50) in a Dictator Game where the recipient was a charity and
(51) in a Trust Game found pseudo-volunteers to behave more “pro-socially”,
which is in accordance of such hypothesis. Such effects could be even more
pronounced when the experimenter is a professor of that specific class or
course. The most recent evidence concerning self-selection (49) compares
the frequency of a non-experimental decision (i.e., donation to a fund)
between students who self-select to experiments and students who do not
and finds no difference. Focusing on non-student populations, an appropriate
dataset is even more difficult to obtain. We are aware of only two studies. (47)
compares truck drivers (a kind of pseudo-volunteers) with volunteers sampled
from a non-student population in a social dilemma game. (48) compares the
distribution of attributes between participants of a survey who decide to
participate in an experiment and those who decide not to. Both studies report
non-significant differences.
Summarizing, the literature is not conclusive on whether self-selection is an
issue in extrapolating experimental subjects’ behavior into other groups. Even
less on whether self-selection affects students and non-students in the same
way since differences in methodologies (regarding whether the comparison is
about attributes or decisions, whether the latter are experimental or nonexperimental and more importantly whether the same design and recruitment
procedures were followed) do not allow comparisons.

So, studies on student and self-selection bias, taken together suggest that
studying the representativeness of subjects’ social behavior requires the
simultaneous examination of student bias within both volunteers and nonvolunteers and self-selection bias within both students and non-students.
Using the 2x2 factorial design depicted in Figure 1a, we report data from a
large-scale survey-experiment that allows such a ceteris paribus investigation
of student and self-selection bias.

Figure 1: Experimental design sample classification

A representative sample of a city’s adult population participated in three
experimental games (Dictator Game (DG), Ultimatum Game (UG), and Trust
Game (TG)) involving five decisions (see Figure 2). In addition, a rich sociodemographic set of information was gathered in order to serve as controls,
which are necessary in order to isolate student and self-selection effects.
Lastly, each individual was classified as a volunteer or non-volunteer based
on their willingness to participate in future experiments in the laboratory (see
Methods). Our final sample (N=765 after excluding incomplete observations)
therefore consists of both students and non-students as well as both
volunteers and non-volunteers (see Figure 1b).

Figure 2: Experimental decisions

Results
As Figure 1b illustrates, our final sample consists of:
•

22% students (n=170).

•

46% volunteers (n=350).

•

12% “standard” subject pool (students x volunteers) (n=90).

The first models (left-hand side) in each column of Table 1 report the
estimated main effects of being a student and a volunteer on behavior. The
second models explore the interaction effects of the two (student x volunteer).
These models allow student bias to be studied separately within volunteers
and non-volunteers and in the same manner, self-selection bias within
students and non-students. The regressions in columns i, ii, and iii model
participants’ offers in the DG, the UG and the difference between the two,
thus capturing strategic behavior, respectively. Columns iv, v, and vi repeat
the same exercise for the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) as a second
mover in the UG, the decision to pass money or not in the binary TG, and the
decision to return money or not as a second mover in the same game,
respectively. Note that in all regressions we control for basic sociodemographics (age, sex, income and educational level) as well as for risk and
time preferences, cognitive abilities and social capital as possible confounding
factors.

…. Table 1: Student and self-selection biases on behavior …

Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates from the between-group comparisons
obtained by the corresponding Wald tests on Table 1 models.
Student bias: Students are more strategic players (p=0.012) mostly because
they make less generous DG offers (p=0.060). However, these differences
are never larger than 6% of the pie. Through Wald tests, we identify the
student bias to be mainly manifested among volunteers (A vs. C, p=0.028;
see Table 2).
Self-selection bias: Volunteers are more likely to both trust (6.6%, marginal
effects corresponding to the probit estimates reported in Tables 1 and 2) and
to reciprocate the trust (7.7%) than non-volunteers in the TG (p=0.051 and
p=0.011, respectively). However, the first difference vanishes when making
pairwise comparisons within groups. That is, the aggregate effect is not
specifically attributable to either students (A vs. B) or non-students (C vs. D)
(p>0.12 in both cases). The second difference can be essentially traced back
to non-students (p=0.023) since it is largely insignificant for students
(p=0.440). Nonetheless, self-selection bias slightly affects students as well:
self-selected students make (marginally) significantly higher offers than the
rest of students in the UG (p=0.084).
As a final exercise we compare self-selected students with both the rest of the
sample (A vs. B+C+D) and group D, which comprises non-students, nonvolunteers as an estimation of the subject-pool bias. We find the behavior of
group A to be different from the rest of the sample only regarding UG offers,
and at marginally significant levels (p=0.092), as they offer €0.66 more (3.3%
of the pie). As can be inferred from Table 2, this effect must be emanating
from the self-selection bias revealed in this decision among students. The
comparison between groups A and D yields only one (marginally) significant
result as well. Self-selected students increase their offers between DG and
UG by €0.94 more than non-self-selected, non-students (p=0.094). This effect
makes sense as well since students have been reported previously to be
more strategic players than non-students (A+B vs. C+D). Finally, since self-

selection was revealed to be an issue only among non-students (C vs. D), the
absence of significant differences in TG behavior (ps>0.49) is not surprising.
…. Table 2: Between-group comparisons….

Due to the complex interpretation of non-linear interaction effects (53), we
replicate the regressions of columns iv, v, and vi using one dummy for each
group (A, B, C, and D). The results remain exactly the same. Additionally,
replication of the regressions using alternative classification of students does
not alter the general picture (see Methods and Tables S2 - S4 in the
supplementary materials).

Discussion
This paper presents data that allows disentangling the separate effects of
student and self-selection bias. Evidence for both is found. However, the
results also tell another parallel story: in five experimental decisions and
following the exact same procedures for all subjects, self-selected students
have been proven to behave in a very similar manner with every other group
separately and in combination. Indeed, at the conventional 5% level only one
significant effect concerning self-selected students is observed and, in
addition, the difference is economically small. That said, we suggest that the
findings do not discredit the use of self-selected students in experiments
measuring social preferences. Rather the opposite: the convenient sample of
self-selected college students that allowed a boom in human experimentation
in both social and natural sciences produces qualitatively and quantitatively
accurate results. Models on human social behavior, evolutionary dynamics
and social networks together with the implications that they bare are not in
danger from this particular subject pool. The results caution, however, on the
use of alternative samples such as self-selected non-students that typically
participate in artefactual field and internet experiments, aimed at better
representativeness, since the effect of self-selection can be even more
pronounced outside the student community (self-selection bias is proved to be
an issue mainly among non-students in the Trust Game).

Methods
The experiment took place from November 23rd to December 15th 2010. A
total of 835 individuals aged between 16 and 91 years old participated in the
experiment. One out of ten participants was randomly selected to be paid.
The average earnings among winners, including those winning nothing
(18.75%), were €9.60.
Sampling: A stratified random method was used to obtain the sample. In
particular, the city of Granada (Spain) is divided into nine geographical
districts, which served as sampling strata. Within each stratum we applied a
proportional random method to minimize sampling errors. In particular, the
sample was constructed in four sequential steps: 1. We randomly selected a
number of sections proportional to the number of sections within each district;
2. We randomly selected a number of streets proportional to the number of
streets within each section; 3. We randomly selected a number of buildings
proportional to the number of buildings on each street; 4. Finally, we randomly
selected a number of apartments proportional to the number of apartments
within each building. This method ensures a geographically representative
sample. Detailed information can be found in supplementary materials.
Our sample consists of individuals who agreed to complete the survey at the
moment the interviewers asked them to participate. Being interviewed in their
own apartments decreased opportunity cost (thus increasing the participation
rate). In order to control for selection bias within households, only the
individual who opened the door was allowed to participate. Lastly, the data
collection process was well distributed across both daytime and weekday. Our
sampling procedure resulted in a representative sample in terms of age and
sex (see Table S7 in the supplementary materials).
Interviewers: The data were collected by 216 university students (grouped in
108 pairs) enrolled in a course on field experiments in the fall of 2010. The
students underwent ten hours of training in the methodology of economic field
experiments, conducting surveys, and sampling procedures. Their performance was carefully monitored through a web-based system (details in the
supplementary materials).

Protocol: The interviewers introduced themselves to the prospective
participants and explained that they were carrying out a study for the
University of Granada. Upon agreement to participate, the participants were
informed that the data would be used for scientific purposes only and under
conditions of anonymity according to the Spanish law on data protection. One
interviewer always read the questions aloud, while the other noted down the
answers (with the exception of the experimental decisions). The survey lasted
on average 40 minutes and consisted of three parts. In the first part, extensive
socioeconomic information of the participants was collected including, among
others, risk and time preferences, and social capital. In the second part,
participants played three paradigmatic games of research on social
preferences, namely the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game and the Trust
Game (see Figure 2). In the last part, they had to state their willingness to
participate in future monetary-incentivized experiments (which would take
place in the laboratory at the School of Economics).
Experimental Games: At the beginning of the second part, and before any
details were given about each decision in particular, the participants received
some general information about the nature of the experimental economic
games according to standard procedures. In particular, participants were
informed that:
•

The five decisions involved real monetary payoffs coming from a
national research project endowed with a specific budget for this
purpose.

•

The monetary outcome would depend only on the participant’s decision
or on both his/her own and another randomly matched participant’s
decision, whose identity would forever remain anonymous.

•

One of every ten participants would be randomly selected to be paid,
and the exact payoff would be determined by a randomly selected role.
In deciding 1/10 instead of higher probabilities (for instance 1/5), we
took into account two issues: the cognitive effects of using other
probabilities and the (commuting) costs of paying people given the
dispersion of participants throughout the city. Interestingly, 297

subjects (39% of the sample) believed that they would be selected to
be paid (last item of the second part).
•

Matching and payment would be implemented within the next few days.

•

The procedures ensured absolute double-blinded anonymity by using a
decision sheet, which they would place in the envelope provided and
then seal. Thus, participants’ decisions would remain forever blind in
the eyes of the interviewers, the researchers, and the randomly
matched participant.

Once the general instructions had been given, the interviewer read the details
for each experimental decision separately. After every instruction set,
participants were asked to write down their decisions privately and proceed to
the next task. To control for possible order effects on decisions, the order both
between and within games was randomized across participants, resulting in
24 different orders (always setting aside the two decisions of the same game).
In the Dictator and Ultimatum Game (proposer) participants had to split a pie
of €20 between themselves and another anonymous participant. Subjects
decided which share of the €20 they wanted to transfer to the other
participant. In the case of the Ultimatum Game, implementation was upon
acceptance of the offer by the randomly matched responder; in case of
rejection neither participant earned anything. For the role of the responder in
the Ultimatum Game we used the strategy method in which subjects had to
state their willingness to accept or reject each of the proposals depicted in
Figure 2. In the Trust Game, the trustor (1st pl.) had to decide whether to pass
€10 or €0 to the trustee (2nd pl.). In case of passing €0, the trustor earned €10
and the trustee nothing. If she passed €10, the trustee would receive €40
instead of €10 (money was being quadrupled). The trustee, conditional on the
trustor having passed the money had to decide whether to send back €22 and
keep €18 for himself or keep all €40 without sending anything back, in which
case the trustor did not earn anything (see the supplementary materials).
Classifying students: Individuals between 18 and 26 years old who reported to
be studying at the moment were classified as students. The upper age bound
(26 years old) was selected taking into account the mean maximum age of the
lab experiments taken place in the University of Granada and a large drop in

the age histogram of our sample. In order to address potential concerns
regarding this classification, alternative ways of classifying students were
used. In particular we replicated the analysis setting the upper bounds at 24
and 28 years old. Moreover, we did the same classifying as “students” all
individuals who have ever been in the university, without posing any age limit
whatsoever. Results in the three cases remained the same in essence. The
regressions can be found in the supplementary materials.
Classifying volunteers: Following Van Lange et al. (54) in their application of
the measure developed by McClintock and Allison (55), we classified
participants according to the response to the following question:
“At the School of Economics we invite people to come to make decisions with
real money like the ones you made earlier (the decisions in the envelope). If
we invite you, would you be willing to participate?”

Note, however that we have intentionally removed any helping framing. Van
Lange et al. (54, pg. 281) for example first stated: “the quality of scientific
research of psychology at the Free University depends to a large extent on
the willingness of students to participate in these studies” and then proceeded
in asking them their willingness to participate in future studies. It is also
important to mention that the willingness to participate in future experiments
was stated before matching between participants and payments were done.
So, by design, the variable of interest could not have been affected by the
outcome of the games.
Furthermore, in order to differentiate self-selection in economic experiments
from the general propensity to help research studies and the need for social
approval (see 25), we also asked individuals about their willingness to
participate in future surveys. A total of 478 stated that they would be willing to
participate in future surveys, while only 350 said they would participate in
experiments. Of these, 49 stated that they would not participate in a survey. In
addition, two months after the experiment, we hired an assistant to call all the
individuals classified as volunteers in order to confirm their interest. In
particular, we requested participants’ authorization to include their data in the
experimental dataset of the Economics Department (ORSEE) (56). Of those
who we were able to contact after two attempts on two consecutive days

(60%), 97% of students and 83% of non-students confirmed their interest. Not
answering the phone makes sense if we consider the enormous amount of
telemarketing calls people receive in Spain and even more so given that the
assistant made calls from a university phone number which is comprised of 13
digits like those of telemarketing companies. Note that regular private
numbers in Spain have 9 digits.
This method of classifying volunteers raises some concerns. In particular, the
stated preference regarding the willingness to participate in future
experiments is never realized. Despite our attempts to ensure that this was
not just cheap talk (by being granted permission to add individuals’ personal
details in ORSEE) the matter of the fact is that we do not know with certainty
whether those classified as volunteers are indeed volunteers. Actually,
completely separating volunteers and non-volunteers is a virtually impossible
task. The very idea of volunteering is a continuous quality instead. However,
by definition, classification requires a line to be drawn. We believe that this
classification method provides a rather clean way to separate ‘more’ selfselected from ‘less’ self-selected individuals.
A second concern is related to the fact that our sample consists of only
individuals who had accepted to fill in a survey. In other words it seems that
we study self-selection using an already self-selected sample. Note however
that individuals have been self-selected into filling in a survey and not into
participating in a lab experiment. In addition our procedures decreased
opportunity costs for participants minimizing this type of self-selection. So,
individuals had to fill in the questionnaire in the comfort of their houses and
without any ex-ante commitment for the future, in contrast to most nation-wide
surveys (CentER, SOEP, BHPS, etc.). Actually, 38% of the participants were
unwilling to participate in a future survey while 54% were not willing to
participate in a lab experiment. This allowed us to observe experimental
behavior of people not willing to participate in lab experiments, playing with
real money and what is more doing so voluntarily.
Of course it can still be true that we are missing one “extreme” category;
those who had refused participation in the survey in the first place. Even in

this case however, if self-selection does indeed affect behavior, it should do
so even in the absence of this extreme category.
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Table 1: Student and self-selection biases on behavior

students
volunteers
students x
volunteers
R2
LR

DG
i
-0.060*
-0.067
(0.032) (0.044)
0.039
0.036
(0.026) (0.024)
0.013
(0.052)

0.007
(0.015)
0.023
(0.015)

-0.006
(0.021)
0.016
(0.016)
0.027
(0.027)

3.80***

1.46**

1.46**

3.79***

UG
ii

UG-DG
iii
0.054**
0.047
(0.021) (0.030)
-0.010
-0.013
(0.019) (0.019)
0.013
(0.039)
0.0941 0.0943

MAO
iv
-0.039
-0.079
(0.105)
(0.165)
0.019
0.000
(0.092)
(0.112)
0.0769
(0.201)
0.0223
0.0224

TG trustor
v
-0.167
-0.242
(0.152)
(0.198)
0.196*
0.159
(0.101)
(0.103)
0.149
(0.259)
0.0600
0.0604

TG trustee
vi
-0.083
-0.034
(0.143)
(0.191)
0.239** 0.266**
(0.094)
(0.117)
-0.096
(0.268)
0.1012
0.1013

5.81***

56.02***

78.49***

98.87***

5.68***

56.60***

81.52***

98.20***

Notes: The dependent variables are (i) the fraction offered in DG; (ii) the fraction offered in UG; and (iii) the fraction offered in UG - the fraction
offered in DG; (iv) the minimum acceptable offer as a fraction of the pie in UG; (v) TG decision as a trustor - 1 if (s)he makes the loan, zero
otherwise; and (vi) TG decision as a trustee - 1 if (s)he returns part of the loan, zero otherwise. Models i and ii are Tobit regressions, model iii is an
OLS regression; model iv is an ordered probit regression, while the last two models are Probit regressions. N=765 in all regressions. Controls are:
age, gender, education, household income, social capital, risk preferences, time preferences, and cognitive abilities. The variables are explained in
2
depth in the supplementary materials. All models are also controlling for order effects. All the likelihood ratios (LR) shown correspond to Chi
statistics, except for column iii, where they are based on F. Robust SE clustered by interviewer (108 groups) and presented in brackets. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.

Table 2: Between-group comparisons
DG

UG

UG-DG

MAO

TG trustor

TG trustee

-0.060*
-0.031
-0.068

0.008
0.021
-0.007

0.054**
0.061**
0.047

-0.039
-0.002
-0.079

-0.168
-0.093
-0.242

-0.083
-0.130
-0.034

0.040
0.051
0.037

0.023
0.044*
0.017

-0.010
0.000
-0.013

0.020
0.078
0.001

0.197*
0.309
0.159

0.240**
0.170
0.266**

-0.012
-0.017

0.033*
0.038

0.039
0.047*

0.021
-0.002

0.080
0.067

0.049
0.136

Student bias
(A+B)
A
B

vs
vs
vs

(C+D)
C
D

Self-selection bias
(A+C)
A
C

vs
vs
vs

(B+D)
B
D

Subject-pool bias
A
A

vs
vs

(B+C+D)
D

Notes: Letters A, B, C and D refer to the groups depicted in Figure 1a. Group A denotes students,
volunteers; B students, non-volunteers; C non-students, volunteers; D non-students, nonvolunteers. (A+B) correspond to all students (volunteers and non-volunteers); (C+D) to all nonstudents (volunteers and non-volunteers); (A+C) to all volunteers (students and non-students);
(B+D) to all non-volunteers (students and non-students). Lastly (B+C+D) correspond to the sum
of the subject pool except students volunteers. *, ** indicate significance at the 0.10, and 0.05
levels, respectively. Comparisons based on Wald tests from models of Table 1.
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